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Regulating
Estrangement:
Human–Animal
Chimeras in
Postgenomic Biology
Amy Hinterberger1
Abstract
Why do laws and regulations marking boundaries between humans and other
animals proliferate amid widespread proclamations of the waning of the spe-
cies concept and the consensus that life is a continuum? Here I consider a
recent spate of new guidelines and regulations in the United Kingdom and
United States that work to estrange human bodies from other animals in
biomedicine. Using the idea of a bioconstitutional moment to understand how
state institutions deliberate over ‘‘human–animal chimeras,’’ I address how
nations differently establish separations between humans and other animals.
New chimeric entities, containing human hereditary material, have con-
secrated regulatory ground and signify increased attention to fields of research
that have long used interspeciesmixing. Regulators andpolicymakers now find
themselves in a curious position. On the one hand, they continue to regulate
the estrangement between humans and other animals, but on the other, they
support the creation of chimeric life––a form of life that draws into question
the very basis of such separations.
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Introduction
What we have come to call the postgenomic era harbors fundamental
transformations in the relations and differences between technology and
biology, human and animal, and the body and environment. One place
where these changes are evident is in the deliberations and governing prac-
tices that address the use of human biological material in other organisms.
Tensions have materialized as the availability of human embryonic stem
cells and induced pluripotent stem cells open the way for creating chimeric
organisms, which involves the transplantation of human cells into animals
that are in embryonic or early fetal stages of development. As a result,
national advisory and regulatory bodies are confronting issues of respon-
sibility and jurisdiction for boundary crossing entities that are not easily
classifiable through traditional regulatory orders. How do regulators dis-
tinguish between species at the level of cells and tissues? How are divi-
sions inserted into cellular worlds where species distinctions do not travel
all the way down to the level of cells? Increasingly, such deliberations fall
to regulatory authorities, advisory bodies, and government departments.
Regulators and policy makers thus find themselves in the curious position
of needing to sustain the legal estrangement between humans and other
animals, while facilitating research on human disease that increasingly
relies on the incorporation of human and animal material into new biolo-
gical entities.
Here I present two case studies of the regulation of chimeric life forms
from the United Kingdom and the United States. I develop these cases in the
context of ‘‘bioconstitutionalism’’ as a framing device to provide a set of
coordinates for comparing each state’s responsibility for life as articulated
in law and policy (Jasanoff 2011a). Bioconstitutionalism brings together an
explicit focus on interconnections between the life sciences and legal prac-
tices, thus focusing on two powerful sources of authoritative knowledge
making––biology and the law. Such an approach provides a vantage point
from which to explore how understandings of life (bios) are tied to the
categories that mark out the legal entitlements, rights, and protections pro-
vided for political subjects in contemporary societies. In both the United
Kingdom and United States, legal practices and thought, particularly in the
context of biomedicine, have focused primarily on the category of the
individual human person.
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Foregrounding this focus on the individual, in her recently edited col-
lection, Jasanoff (2011b, 289) argues that ‘‘bioconstitutionalism directs us
first and foremost to the position of the individual human within a consti-
tutional order that recognizes liberties, grants rights and provides means of
representation . . . .’’ Through a bioconstitutional approach, I explore both
the biological and legal assumptions that underpin the politically salient
concept of the individual human and how forms of chimeric life challenge
these assumptions. In Europe and North America, the ethical regulation of
biomedicine is largely premised on the idea of the individual human,
with regulation being split into two categories: human and animal.1 Such
legal divisions have significant consequences for those beings protected
under the rubric of human and those not. In the cross-national compar-
ison detailed below, I argue that while each national culture is oriented
toward maintaining regulatory estrangement between humans and other
animals, how such estrangement is institutionally practiced and under-
stood, as a matter of ethics and law, differs greatly. To do this, I draw on
multisited fieldwork that I conducted with biomedical advisory groups
and regulatory bodies as well as interviews with scientists, bioethicists,
and policy makers in the United Kingdom and Unites States between
2011 and 2014. Such differences demonstrate an intriguing variability
with respect to the supposedly settled notion of the individual human––
so often assumed a foundational and unchanging figure of Euro-American
political cultures.
While it is common to encounter sweeping claims about how new bio-
medical technologies change what it means to be human, such claims are
rarely supported with fine-grained evidence about how scientists, policy
makers, and institutions practically and technically approach the human
across genetic, cellular, and organismal levels. Such definitional moments
are illuminating for those interested in science and technology studies
(STS), however, for two main reasons. First, STS has a deep analytical
investment in what we can broadly call the nonhuman. However, in direct-
ing energies toward such domains, it is possible that changes in its assumed
opposite referent (i.e., the human) are neglected and thus require some
empirical reenchantment. Drawing on a bioconstitutional approach, I argue
that we should not presume to know what materially constitutes the human
and animal research subject in biomedicine. Second, while debates about
human–animal chimeras may represent another permutation of regulatory
hand-wringing, such deliberations, and their settlements, will have long-
term consequences for the forms of life valued and recognized by our
political communities.
Hinterberger 3
Hereditary Materials in a Postgenomic Era
Human brain cells inside mice and monkeys, organs populated with human
cells in pigs, and embryos that are 99.9 percent human—such entities have
been anticipated as both vital and useful for bioscientific research (Oured-
nik et al. 2001; Han et al. 2013). While there is a long history of the use of
animals for understanding human physiology and disease, advances in the
power of techniques involved in these studies are producing an ever-
widening range of mixtures. The creation of humanized animals as both
research tools and therapeutic objects has been made easier by new gene-
editing technologies like the CRISPR2/Cas system. For example, the
Guardian newspaper (Davis and Rawlinson 2016) recently reported on
US-based researchers who used the CRISPR gene-editing technique to
knock out a section of a pig’s DNA necessary for a pig embryo to develop
a pancreas. Human induced pluripotent stem cells were then injected into
the pig embryo, which matured for twenty-eight days, before development
was terminated and the tissues analyzed. Such experiments are dedicated to
cultivating human organs in pigs. This example shows how the ability to
manipulate genetic sequences and advances in embryo and stem cell tech-
nologies make it increasingly possible to replace animal material with
human tissues and cells. Often called human–animal chimeras, such entities
are used both to support basic research into human biology, health, and
disease and to develop and test drugs and other therapies.
The goal of humanizing other animals so that they literally embody
human biological processes has reintroduced the question of what consti-
tutes human biological material and at what threshold does the accumula-
tion of this material in other biological entities result in what are considered
human functions, capacities, and attributes. Davies (2012, 126) captures the
intricacies, fragility, and potentials of these technologies when she poses the
question ‘‘what is a humanized mouse?’’ She argues that chimeric mice
move our attention toward the intimate geographies of corporeal equiva-
lence between humans and animals and to the expansive geographies of
translational research. The mouse is thus a site from which to view both the
remaking of species boundaries and the politics and practices of biomedical
research itself. Such shifts are also characterized by Friese and Clark (2012,
46) as ‘‘transpositions,’’ where changing practices of modeling in the life
sciences are part of larger social, material, discursive, and spatial reconfi-
gurations of human and animal bodies.
Drawing on these characterizations of chimeric life, in this article, I
approach chimeras as both the material manifestation of biological practice
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and the very entities that cast doubt over the assumptions that guide that
practice. Chimeras contain tissues or cells from genetically different organ-
isms that coexist together, thus casting uncertainty over the natural basis of
biological reproduction. This article focuses on contemporary entities, often
created in a laboratory, whose existence is legitimized through the pursuit
of human health. However, chimeras have a long history in botany, zool-
ogy, evolutionary theory, experimental embryology, and developmental
genetics (see, e.g., McLaren 1976; Margulis, Asikainen, and Krumbein
2011; Friese 2013). Used as a research tool to investigate human disease
and model human systems outside the body, chimeric organisms are part of
long-standing histories of ‘‘culturing life’’ (Landecker 2006).
While chimeric entities have been fundamental to experimental research
in biology since its inception, it is ‘‘human–animal chimeras’’ that have
become a lightning rod of ethical, legal, and regulatory anxiety in many
countries (see Danish Council of Ethics 2007; Deutsche Welle 2008; Tau-
pitz and Weschka 2009; Academy of Medical Sciences 2011; Ho 2016).
This has made them the histrionic entities of bioethical deliberation (Greely
2003; Baylis and Roberts 2007). However, the figure of the chimera has for
a long time been a potent character in contemporary thought: ‘‘we are all
chimeras, theorized and fabricated hybrids of machine and organism; in
short, we are cyborgs’’ (Haraway 1991, 141).
In another chimera story, Margulis, Asikainen, and Krumbein (2011)
explain that the earliest nucleated cell developed from a merger of a
sulfide-gas-making archaebacterium and a eubacterium some 1,200 million
years ago. This sulfate-metabolizing chimera is the ancestor of all nucleated
life forms today (of which humans, other animals, and plants are made).
Chimeras abound not just as engineered and precarious laboratory con-
structs but also in everyday life.3 Those of us who have had a blood transfu-
sion meet the definition of being an intraspecific chimera. That is, we carry
a small number of foreign cells from another member of our species. For
Margulis et al., ‘‘chimeras are real. Life is not shy’’ (2011, 4).
Chimeras thus provide a vantage point from which to consider how the
tools, methods, and materials of biological practice have come under delib-
eration because of their potentiality for new forms of life and the possible
suspension of species lines.
Waning Species and Regulating Estrangement
The chimeras of postgenomic biology present new forms of multispecies
entanglements. Such entanglements challenge ethical and regulatory
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systems premised on a stark division between the rights of constitutionally
recognized human individuals and other beings who do not receive similar
forms of legal protection. These divisions are brought into relief by groups
like the Nonhuman Rights Project, whose members seek to change the legal
status of nonhuman animals to ‘‘persons,’’ as only persons can possess fun-
damental rights like bodily integrity and bodily liberty because, as they put it:
‘‘The only animal with legal rights is the human animal. No other animal has
any rights at all.’’4 These legally enshrined differences, however, cannot be so
easily followed down to the level of cells and tissues where the postgenomic
era has ushered in a consensus that life is a continuum.
Describing the technical practices underpinning this consensus, the chair
of the recent UK Academy of Medical Sciences report, ‘‘Animals Contain-
ing Human Material’’ explained to me:
The concept of significantly distinct species has waned as more organisms are
genetically sequenced, more and more of these mixing experiments were
done. We all got used to the idea that life is a continuum. You can take
something from yeast and put it in a mouse and something else from a
chimpanzee and put it in a cow and more or less you can map things onto
each other and they sort of work. Obviously there are big and important
differences but an awful lot of the basic machinery is fundamentally
unchanged. (Animals Containing Human Material (ACHM) chair, interview
with author, 2012)
The kind of continuum described here is analogous to other expressions of
the species concept in postgenomic biology (e.g., Collins et al. 2003). Given
these histories of mixing in biology and the waning of the species concept
itself, why have ‘‘human–animal chimeras’’ become objects of regulatory
anxiety and deliberation? Reflecting on this question of ‘‘why now?’’ the
academy chair remarked: ‘‘It’s all very well to say people have been doing
this [mixing] for forty years and every scientist knows about it. But outside
of the biologists doing this kind of work nobody knows about it. It’s never
spoken of’’ (ACHM chair, interview with author, 2012).
Not only is chimeric work rarely part of public discourse, the legal and
ethical frames that govern this research are starkly divided between human
and animal. To this end, the waning of the species concept in biology has
not been met with a more elastic sensibility that recognizes our linked
biology with other organisms. Rather, regulatory and ethical oversight in
both the United Kingdom and United States has, at least so far, shored up
these vast and abstract categories through processes of what I will call
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regulatory estrangement. In both the United States and United Kingdom,
biological entities, for the purposes of regulation, need to be either human or
animal. They cannot be both at the same time. This is the principle of regula-
tory estrangement upon which bureaucratic and institutional authorities in the
United States and United Kingdom both labor. The making of definitional
boundaries between human and animal at the level of cells and tissues thus
requires laborious forms of constant and ongoing disentanglement.5
However, in examining such ‘‘bioconstitutional moments’’ (Jasanoff
2011a) where disentangling occurs, it is also clear that who gets to draw
boundaries, and with what resources, varies greatly between nations. This
suggests that the ontological schemes under which scientists and lawmakers
are assumed to labor in Western democracies are far from singular. Onto-
logical schemes in Western science may not be so ‘‘settled’’ (Candea 2013;
Franklin 2013a) as new forms of ‘‘ontological surgery’’ (Jasanoff 2011c,
61) are afoot in the spaces between law and biology.
For example, the legal and regulatory structure of biomedical research in
the United Kingdom is highly targeted and specific. It focuses on the rights
of living individual human beings and involves ethical commitments of
informed consent and doing no harm to research participants (for a geneal-
ogy of this human subject, see Reubi 2012). Biological materials derived
from the female human body, such as embryos, are also targets of explicit
regulation. In accordance with the Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Act 2008, the UK’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority
(HFEA) governs any research or medical procedures that involve human
embryos outside the body. Other kinds of detached human body parts are
less clearly regulated and are variously subject to the UK’s Human Tissue
Act, principles for the use of genetically modified organisms, intellectual
property (patent) law, and the Data Protection Act.
Conversely, the use of nonhuman animals in biomedical research is
regulated by the Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986 (ASPA). It is
a division of the Home Office that is responsible for implementing this Act
and operating the licensing and inspection system. The Home Office jur-
isdiction is particular here because regulating biomedical research is not a
core objective of this government department, which is responsible for
immigration, security, and law and order. All animals imported or bred and
used for research in the United Kingdom must be approved through the
inspection and licensing of facilities by the scientific procedures inspecto-
rate of the Home Office.
The UK legislation that governs human bodies or their parts (such as
embryos) does not attempt to define words such as human. However, the
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Animals Act does define the animals that fall under its prerogative: ‘‘all
living vertebrates, other than man, and any living cephalopod’’ (ASPA).
Here the definition of animal rests on an assumed referent of ‘‘man’’ that
does not exist in a legal or legislative sense. In this law, animals also include
embryonic and fetal forms, particularly those living beyond the last third of
their gestation or incubation period. Animal embryos fall under the purview
of the Home Office, whereas human embryos are subject to a highly tar-
geted and specific genealogy of protection and ‘‘special status’’ through the
UK’s HFEA (Warnock 1985; Jasanoff 2011c).
In the United States, the practical matters of separating humans from
other animals in biomedical research follow a different ethical and legal
topography. The most visible debates in the United States have been pre-
dominately focused on the status of human embryos, abortion, and stem cell
research (Maienschein 2003; Bonnicksen 2009). Because of this, concerns
about the impermissible mixing of human and animal have been less polit-
ically visible than in the United Kingdom where formalized public debate
has occurred.6 In the United States, there is no formal legal regulation of
human–animal chimeras despite some failed legislative attempts. The
United States does not have a body similar to that of the UK’s HFEA. As
a result, one of the ways in which controversial research becomes adjudi-
cated is through funding moratoriums imposed by federal bodies.
For example, in late September 2015, the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) declared a moratorium on funding a specific kind of chimeric
research that involves the insertion of human stem cells into very early
embryos from other animals. This kind of research seeks to develop human
organs for transplantation in other animals as well as to humanize biological
systems and parts of other animals to study disease. However, similar to
other instances where federal research monies are removed from contro-
versial research, as with human embryonic stem cell lines in the previous
decade, such research can continue, but with private monies. The morator-
ium was met with some skepticism and criticism of researchers working in
this domain who, in a letter to Science, argued that such a moratorium
impeded the progress of regenerative medicine (Sharma et al. 2015). In
2016, the NIH announced that it would replace the moratorium with a new
kind of review for specific types of chimera research.7
Roughly, the institutional governing structures in the United States look
like this: institutional review boards (IRBs) deal with humans, institutional
animal care and use committees (IACUCs) deal with animals, and embryo-
nic stem cell research oversight (ESCRO) committees deal with human
embryos or materials derived from embryos. The original mandate for these
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oversight committees was set out in the 2005 National Academy of Science
(NAS) guidelines, which operates as the de facto regulation for research
involving human embryos and stem cells. These committees are tied to
research institutions and are responsible for assessing the possible risk of
human contributions to other animals in research.
While the legal and regulatory landscapes in the United States and
United Kingdom differ, one common dimension is the recent and vigorous
response from governing authorities to biological entities that do not easily
fit into the established legal and political orders. In both countries, the
practices of postgenomic biology, which feature unparalleled corporeal
intimacies between humans and other animals, have been met with the need
to determine how such entities belong to regulatory orders. There is a
particular swiftness with which these countries have responded through,
for example, the UK Academy of Medical Sciences report, ‘‘Animals Con-
taining Human Material’’ (2011) and the recent moratorium in the United
States on research that involves the introduction of human pluripotent cells
into other animal embryos in the early stages of development. The effect of
these combined responses has not been to eliminate the idea of the individ-
ual human research subject from ethical protection or to enter into some
kind of posthuman regulatory era. Rather, as the species concept wanes, the
new guidelines and regulations emerging to reorient divisions between
human and other animal bodies are indicative of a bioconstitutional
moment––a moment in which institutions and cultures struggle to make
sense of biological materials and practices that de-stabilize the law’s con-
ceptual categories (Jasanoff 2011a, 3).
Regulating Estrangement I
In 2011, members of the HFEA, Home Office, Department of Health, and
Academy of Medical Sciences met to discuss a regulatory predicament.
This predicament was ushered in by the word ‘‘predominant’’ as part of
the definition of a human admixed embryo in the recently revised HFEA
Act. In the Act, a human admixed embryo refers to embryos that are either
entirely or ‘‘predominately’’ human or ‘‘equally’’ human and animal. Here
the legal categories of human and animal are brought into explicit recog-
nition and dialogue. The ‘‘human admixed embryo’’ as a recent object of
law has a long genealogy, stemming from a series of entities (some only
proposed, some created) that were subject to public deliberation, parliamen-
tary debate, and regulatory deliberation in the United Kingdom from 2006
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to 2008, when the Act was revised (Brown 2009; Haddow et al. 2010; Parry
2010; Harvey and Salter 2012).
In a north London office building, with a ready supply of tea, coffee, and
slightly warm sandwiches, these experts deliberated on chimeric organisms
and other boundary crossing entities. In their discussions, they observed that
while the definition of a human admixed embryo encompasses many dif-
ferent kinds of mixtures (such as hybrid embryos, transgenic embryos, and
cytoplasmic hybrid embryos), the proposition of chimeric embryos was
particularly unsettling. This is because the cellular makeup of an embryo
that is manipulated to contain both human and nonhuman material may
change over time. In such a case, the experts around the table all agreed,
it would be extremely difficult to assess whether human or animal DNA is
predominant. This would be particularly troubling because it would not be
clear who had jurisdiction over such an entity––on one side of the table sat
the HFEA, which has jurisdiction over only human embryos, and on the
other side was the Home Office, which has jurisdiction over animal
embryos. Those attending the committee meeting agreed that this posed a
problem. Such a regulatory separation between animals and humans
resulted in a cliff edge effect: any human embryo used for research cannot
be kept beyond the fourteen-day stage, whereas an embryo judged to be
animal (or predominantly animal) is unregulated until the midpoint of
gestation and can in principle be kept indefinitely.
In looking to resolve this cliff edge problem, the group discussed a form
of regulation where scientists would hold licenses from both the Home
Office and the HFEA at the outset of the experiment in case embryos took
a more human or animal direction. Yet this seemed cumbersome and
incompatible with the current legal system in which entities are classified
as either human or animal. For the purposes of regulation in the United
Kingdom, entities need clear categorization as either human or animal.
Such a designation is required to determine whether research is legal and
on what basis.
However, as a result of the regulatory deliberations over the term ‘‘pre-
dominant,’’ the HFEA and Home Office have begun to work together in a
rather unprecedented partnership. Communicating across the abstracted
categories of human and animal in order to provide guidance to UK
researchers was unanticipated by both organizations. The former chief
executive of the HFEA explains:
The particular issue for us, which is very specific, is the diplomatic relations
with the Home Office. We’ve got to work with them and we don’t always
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have to work with another government department . . . their interest in animals
is not where ours are. (Interview with author, 2012)
Whereas previously they could labor separately in their regulatory
domains, the Home Office and HFEA are now sharing an interest in
how to develop systems of metrics to ensure that no impermissible huma-
nizing occurs in organisms used for research.8 Both the Home Office and
HFEA are working within a long history of regulatory estrangement
between humans and other animals in the biosciences. And while members
from institutional bodies across the United Kingdom recognize that it will
likely be a rare case where jurisdiction and classification confusion might
arise, clarity for future research is held paramount in UK national research
culture.
For public bodies, such as the HFEA, the regulatory requirement of
assigning biological entities to either the human or animal category is not
just technical and legal but also symbolic. Living up to their mythical and
monstrous associations, ‘‘human–animal chimeras’’ open up spaces of
deliberation with strong affective ties to what is seen as natural and unna-
tural. In this way, the relationship between potentiality and humanization,
and species closeness and separation, impinge upon how chimeric organ-
isms are regulated. A leading UK geneticist at the University of Oxford
explains how the push toward humanization and its increasing sophistica-
tion may be interpreted in terms of potential:
I think there probably isn’t a major issue with a pig or a cow or a mouse but
there would be with a monkey because they’re so very close. So their ability
to become more humanized is a much more tenable concept. (Interview with
author, 2012).
Within the United Kingdom, the mechanisms of law and regulation are
being pushed in new directions, as humanization becomes a tenable concept
and a material reality in biological practice.
The legal and regulatory meaning of ‘‘predominant’’ will likely be sub-
ject to further specification and change if it is challenged in law, thus
forcing the definitional issue. Despite previous legal challenges in the
United Kingdom to the HFEA Act (e.g., Quintavalle v. HFEA [2005]
UKHL 28), the kinds of regulatory models developed in the United King-
dom hold great international appeal in other countries that are deliberating
species separation in biomedical research, such as Singapore. Thus, as the
former HFEA chief executive reflects:
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The kind of public body we are is a very British thing. You find that our
members apply to be on it and they’re selected not because they’re very good
at what they do (because most people who apply are very good at what they
do). We end up with a group of people simply who are seen to be the kind of
people that everybody else thinks should make these intractable decisions.
(Interview with author, 2012).
Indeed, those around the meeting table deliberating over the question of
how to know when a mixed embryo might take a more ‘‘human’’ or
‘‘animal’’ direction are acutely aware of the intractability of their own
deliberations. But there is also recognition of the legal infrastructures
that confine regulators to particular kinds of disentangling and species
separation. Clarity, in regulation, is provided by carefully considered
boundaries and robust regulation, aiming to remove elements of
uncertainty.
In the case of the ‘‘predominant’’ predicament, there is a realigning of
old separations based on previous settlements over embryo research, but
there has also been the repositioning of new associations. Within the law,
human embryos can have ‘‘animal DNA’’ in them and continue to be
classified as legally human. While the figure of the animal has had a
long-standing history in nation making as a mirror from which to view the
development of the category human and its associated rights (e.g., Ohnuki-
Tierney 1989; Carter and Charles 2011), here the animal is both mirror and
material participant in refashioning regulatory formations. This adds fresh
dynamics to the dusty reference to ‘‘man’’ in the ASPA. The act applies to
any living vertebrate animal other than ‘‘man,’’ but in legal terms, we can
see that now ‘‘man’’ encompasses some new political subjects: ‘‘predomi-
nantly human’’ human–animal entities.
Regulating Estrangement II
Depending on techniques and procedures, in the United States, the creation
of human–animal chimeras is regulated by a variety of federal and state
statutes and court decisions. The most significant guidelines relating to the
creation of chimeric entities are found in the 2005 US NAS guidelines,
which have been revised numerous times and are currently undergoing
another revision. The NAS is not a governmental agency nor does it have
enforcement power, but the guidelines are viewed to be binding by govern-
mental and institutional authorities. In 2005, these guidelines offered a
common set of ethical standards for a field that, due to the absence of
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comprehensive federal funding, was lacking national standards for research.
The NAS guidance acts as the principal reference on the limits of permis-
sible research for embryonic stem cell lines and sets out specific recom-
mendations applicable to research using interspecies chimeras involving
human embryonic stem cells and other stem cell types.
After former President Bush declared that only a few stem cell lines
would receive research funding, the NAS appointed a committee to provide
guidance about what researchers could do with the cell lines that matched
the Bush criteria. The guidelines developed by these committees have
become the community standard in the United States. A member of this
committee explained to me that in developing the 2005 guidelines, ‘‘the big
question was what would be considered acceptable and what would not’’
along with the issue of ‘‘how much you could humanize and in what ways
you could humanize and what kinds of animals you could use’’ (former
NAS committee member, interview with author, 2014).
Human Contributions
In the end, the NAS guidelines recommended that all research combining
human embryonic stem cells with nonhuman embryos, fetuses, or adult
vertebrate animals must be submitted to a local IACUC for review of
animal welfare issues and to an ESCRO committee for consideration of the
consequences of the ‘‘human contributions to any resulting chimeras’’
(NAS 2010, 32). ESCROs are both the result of and subject to the 2005
guidelines. Thus, in the United States, the regulation and proposed creation
of ‘‘human–animal chimeras’’ has been delegated to the same extralegal
bodies that consider the ethics of human embryo research: ESCRO com-
mittees. It is within these local-level committees (convened by research
institutions) that deliberations over interspecies molecular mixtures occur.
Unlike the HFEA, which is a national regulator, these committees operate at
the level of the institution where the research is taking place.
Jasanoff (2011c, 73) provides an apt description of these committees,
which, while not mandated by law, are steeped in particular forms of insti-
tutional and scientific authority: ‘‘a committee that operates outside the
requirements of the law is a particularly interesting site for observing the
influence of bioconstitutionalism: it is a private sphere, in that it is not
governed by the state, and yet it is concerned with the legitimacy and
enforceability of its decisions.’’ These committees meet to discuss any
experiment where a human contribution to an animal might be considered
unethical. This includes, for example, the possibility that human cells could
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contribute in a major organized way to the brain of a recipient animal (NAS
2010, 32-33). The guidelines also state that for experiments in which human
embryonic stem cells, their derivatives, or other pluripotent cells are intro-
duced into nonhuman fetuses and allowed to develop into adult chimeras,
there needs to be careful consideration because ‘‘human contribution to the
resulting animal may be higher’’ (NAS 2010).
Unlike IRBs, which are now registered at the federal level (e.g., you can
request to know who was sitting on an IRB during a certain time), the
ESCRO committee membership is not published. In this sense, ESCRO
committees operate privately within their own institutions and there is no
oversight at a national level in terms of compliance to policy and guidelines.
But while deliberations and decisions are not available for public consump-
tion,9 the physical paper form that researchers must complete before
ESCRO review usually is. These forms differ across research institutions.
For example, Harvard University requests that researchers justify and spe-
cifically discuss ‘‘Research involving the introduction of hES cells into
nonhuman animals at any stage of embryonic, fetal, or postnatal develop-
ment. Particular attention should be given to the probable pattern and
effects of differentiation and integration of the human cells into the nonhu-
man animal tissues.’’10 In contrast, the University of Rochester requests that
if HESC derivatives, HESC cells or other pluripotent cells are going to be
introduced into nonhuman fetuses and are allowed to develop into ‘‘adult
chimeras,’’ that researchers ‘‘please explain the extent of human contribu-
tion to the resulting animal.’’ The Rochester form also requests that
researchers ‘‘please outline anticipated potential consequences of the
human contributions to the resulting chimera’’ as well as any ‘‘anticipated
effect of the human stem cells on the animal’s anatomy, physiology and
species-specific behavior.’’11 This form draws more explicitly on the NAS
guidelines phrasing of parsing out ‘‘human contributions’’ to other animals.
When I asked a former NAS committee member whether there was any
specificity to what might constitute a human contribution to another animal,
he replied: ‘‘No, it’s totally intuitive. I mean, what’s the metric?’’ (former
NAS committee member, interview with author, 2014). He also addressed
the issue of quantification of cell numbers (e.g., percentages of human vs.
animal cells) and argued that this kind of rationalization did not make sense
because ‘‘it’s about what organs are being modified, it’s not about the sheer
numbers. And we are not in a position to know which modifications matter
yet’’ (former NAS committee member, interview with author, 2014).
Indeed, similar to those responsible for such deliberations in the United
Kingdom, those tasked with untangling the categories of human and animal
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in stem cell research are acutely aware of the intractability of their deci-
sions, along with the many unknowns that characterize transposing stem
cells across species at different levels of development. However, rather than
being able to dwell on these unknowns and gray areas, decision makers are
required to siphon new entities into existing regulatory orders. This means
that ESCRO committee deliberations are oriented toward providing a space
for research to happen, not about questioning the basis of legal and ethical
categories. Reflecting on her involvement in the ESCRO committee at
Berkley, Thompson (2013, 64) sums this up: ‘‘putting these regulations into
action, then, is first and foremost about enabling research in an environment
of ethical controversy, and not about ethical inquiry.’’
What is striking about the ESCRO committee form itself is the ontolo-
gical paper trail that it creates: by asking for an account of human contri-
butions to other animals, it brings into explicit discussion categories that
have long been divided in law and policy. But unlike the United Kingdom
where these categories have now been brought into much more intimate
official legislative and public proximity, in the United States, the ESCRO
committee structure keeps these deliberations largely private.
Conclusion: Realigning Separations
Deliberations over chimeric life point our attention to the instability of the
legal category of the individual human relative to other ways of practicing
and thinking biological relations, heighted by the waning of the species
concept. To this end, regulatory estrangement is an expression of current
trends in translational biomedicine where the potentials for life are chang-
ing (Svendsen 2011; Davies 2013; Rajan and Leonelli 2013). By casting
national deliberations through the term estrangement, I have sought to point
to the affective politics that are deeply embedded in how national bodies
approach and deliberate entities that fall under the heading human–animal
chimeras. Estrangement is characterized by being ‘‘alienated in feeling or
affection’’ (Oxford English Dictionary). In focusing on moments of isola-
tion, distance, and separation, we can see what becomes pushed aside, or
repressed, in deliberations over human–animal chimeras, namely, that
humans are animals. In order for a chimeric entity to be knowable (and
hence be regulated or governed), the entity needs to be either human or
animal. Entities that occupy a middle ground between human and animal
cause significant consternation not only in the practical classificatory sense
but also in the ethical and normative sense.
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However, the forms of authority involved in efforts to address such
changes differ, as do notions of what constitutes an adequate resolution.
The United Kingdom has written into law a new kind of human entity that
has legal status: the human admixed embryo. Such a legal entity does not
yet exist in the United States. Also, despite criticism, the United Kingdom’s
HFEA is a widely respected public body, both nationally and internation-
ally. Such an achievement, as Franklin (2013b, 312) argues, is a testament
to how the HFEA has set a course to integrate the concerns of science,
medicine, and society, making it ‘‘nothing short of a national treasure.’’
Such sentiments about the ESCRO process, which is far newer and not
mandated by law, are less strong: in a recent article, the bioethicist Hank
Greely (2013, 44) asks ‘‘have ESCROs been worthwhile?’’ and his answer
is ‘‘a strong, definite ‘probably.’’’
In sum, national advisory and regulatory bodies in the United Kingdom
and United States are confronting issues of responsibility and jurisdiction
for boundary crossing entities that cannot easily be siphoned into the tradi-
tional legal and regulatory orders of either human or animal. This article has
explored how chimeric organisms trouble regulation and law that works to
estrange human bodies and materials from other animals in biomedicine.
With the advent of new and sophisticated forms of human and animal inte-
gration for the study of disease, keeping the human separate from the animal
is becoming increasingly difficult. Novel forms of biological life are being
created that confound long-standing divisions and have challenged the law’s
capacity to simply extend itself over new entities. As material entities, chi-
meric organisms embody new articulations about the plasticity of biology and
the recognition that assumed species differences do not travel all the way
down to the molecular level. Consequently, explicit deliberations for ethical
approaches and governing procedures are also pushed and pulled in new
directions. This remodeling of boundaries in biological practice and state
governance has consequences for humans and animals alike.12
In describing how ethical and legal distances between humans and ani-
mals are being reworked in Western democracies, I have drawn on the
theme of bioconstitutionalism to bring attention to the role of state insti-
tutions in shaping human–animal relations. The coordinates of biocon-
stitutionalism were used to situate the practical labors of regulators and
lawmakers as they seek to place the entities that emerge between the
gaps of cells, tissues, and bodies into regulatory orders. Moving between
the meeting rooms and paper work of regulatory authorities, the article
examined both the material and legal dimensions of the creation and use
of chimeric entities. In doing so, I illustrated practical attempts to
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disentangle human bodies and materials from those of other species
within therapeutically oriented research in biomedicine. These instances
of controversy over new entities also served to give tangible examples of
the implicit conventions of biomedical regulations, which rely on the
fraught, but often empirically underinvestigated, category of human in
the life sciences.
Seen through the lens of regulation and law, institutional authorities must
sustain the long-standing estrangement between humans and other animals
in research. But in working within the frame of regulatory estrangement,
there is not only the careful realigning of old separations but also the
opportunity for repositioning associations. Animalizing humans, while
associated with reductionism, is put into contrast with an ethics of huma-
nization, which requires attention to the material practices of mixture and its
unknown potential qualities. Chimeric organisms that contain bits of human
and nonhuman thus perform a very similar function in law as they do in
biology. In biology, chimeras and their complex constitutions both embody
facts about natural reproduction and simultaneously render unstable ideas
about the natural processes that underlie these facts. As living and changing
entities, chimeric organisms make explicit the very terms of their constitu-
tion, both in law and biology.
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Notes
1. Humans are, of course, animals. While Western societies regard both humans
and animals as living creatures, the legal rights, protections, and forms of
recognition offered to each differ sharply. In biomedical research, animal
experimentation most viscerally captures these divisions. Here my focus is on
how these divisions are negotiated at the level of cells and tissues.
2. CRISPR stands for clustered regularly interspaced short palindromic repeats
and is pronounced ‘‘crisper.’’
3. This article is focused on experimental chimeras; however, the study of what are
called natural or ‘‘found’’ chimeras also shows how chimerism confounds ideas
about what constitutes an individual person or organism. Martin’s (2007) his-
torical analysis of the discovery of ‘‘Mrs McK—the first human chimera’’
brilliantly captures such an episode in midtwentieth-century medicine.
4. See Nonhuman Rights Project: http://www.nonhumanrightsproject.org/.
5. I develop this focus on disentanglement through recent work that engages with
multispecies ethnography in a variety of locations, such as Kelly and Lezaun’s
(2014) work on ‘‘The Pursuit of Interspecies Separation’’ in Dar es Salaam
and Porter’s (2013) work on ‘‘Strategies for Multispecies Coexistence’’ in
Vieˆt Nam.
6. For example, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) ran a
public consultation from April to July 2007 to examine public opinion on the
broad range of hybrid and chimera research.
7. This review will include experiments where human stem cells are mixed with
nonhuman vertebrate embryos and for studies that introduce human cells into
the brains mammals (except rodents, which will be exempt from extra review).
These experiments will go to an internal National Institutes of Health steering
committee of scientists, ethicists, and animal welfare experts that will consider
factors such as the type of human cells, how they will populate in nonhuman
organisms, and whether they may change an animal’s behavior or appearance.
8. Official guidelines were published in February 2016 by the Home Office as a
result of these deliberations, which involved collaboration with the Human
Tissue Authority, the HFEA, and the Academy of Medical Sciences. See Home
Office. ‘‘Guidance on the Use of HumanMaterial in Animals,’’ Advice Note 01/
16. Accessed December 1, 2016. https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/491496/Animals_Containing_Human_
Material_Final_Guidance.pdf.
9. Few firsthand accounts of embryonic stem cell research oversight (ESCRO)
committee deliberations exist in formal published research apart from Jasanoff
(2011c) and Thompson (2013).
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10. See the Office of the Vice Provost for Research Policy, ESCRO. Accessed
November 1, 2015. http://escro.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword¼k50382&ta
bgroupid¼icb.tabgroup120259.
11. See University of Rochester Medical Center. Accessed November 1, 2015.
https://www.urmc.rochester.edu/stem-cell/escro.cfm.
12. New research initiatives such as Laboratory Animals in the Social Sciences and
Humanities signal important shifts toward interdisciplinary research on labora-
tory animal welfare that address these changing spaces and practices of biome-
dical research. See http://labanimalstudies.net/index.html and accompanying
paper of Davies et al. (2016).
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